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Introduction 
China is a disappointing country ; it 
disappoints optimists because it disproves the 
notion that authoritarianism is incompatible 
with significant economic development, and 
it disappoints pessimists because they do not 
expect authoritarian regimes to be durable. 
There are too many paradoxes while talking 
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about the democracy in China. First, 
according to Adam Przeworski and Michael 
Alvarez in What Makes Democracies Endure 
(1996), the effect of socioeconomic change – 
rising literacy, income, and urbanization rates, 
along with improvement of technologies – 
will greatly reduce the legitimacy of 
autocratic rule and foster demands for greater 
222democracy.  Based on the statistical analysis, 
authoritarian regimes become progressively 
more unstable and are likely to become more 
democratic once income per capita rises 
223above 1000 US dollars.  The statistical data 
also shows that only few authoritarian 
regimes can survive once per capita income 
hits more that 6000 US dollars. But, this 
hypothesis is yet to be proven in China. 
China's income per capita is regarded as 
within 'the zone of democratic transition' due 
to its per capita income of around 9100 US 
dollars, compatible with the income level of 
South Korea and Taiwan in the mid-1980s, 
both of which were on the edge of their 
224 democratic transition.  Again, it means 
nothing than empty sheet in China. 
Second, Confucianism is often 
considered as an obstacle for generating a 
supportive spirit of democracy as some critics 
argue that it may legitimize dictatorships. 
However, this stigma had been successfully 
broken in Taiwan. Taiwan is always 
mentioned as a primary example of a Chinese 
nation that is strongly influence by the 
Confucian values, but still able to develop a 
225 democratic regime.
Third, the 2014 Umbrella Movement 
that awakened Hong Kong's pro-democracy 
movement had little impact on China. By the 
end of 2014, the Umbrella Movement in 
Hongkong that opposed the pro-Beijing 
government mobilized grass-root for the 
226 urgent needs of democracy. A Chinese 'Arab 
Spring', as some commentators predicted, did 
not take place and had little impact in 
awakening mainland China's democracy civil 
society organizations. If we were to compare 
the Umbrella movement with the movements 
pushed forward by previous generations that 
222 Adam Przeworski and Michael Alvarez, “What 
Makes Democracies Endure”, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol.7 No.1 (1996), p.40.
223 Ibid, p.41.
224 The entry shows China's GDP on a purchasing 
power parity (PPP) basis divided by population 
as of 1 July in 2013. In 2014, projecting growth 
rates suggests China's size when measured in 
PPP may surpass the United States. See more at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014
-04-30/china-set-to-overtake-u-s-as-biggest-
economy-using-ppp-measure.  
225 David C.Kang, “Stability and Hierarchy in East 
Asian International Relations 1300-1900 CE”, 
in The Balance of Power in World History (New 
York : Palgrave Macmillan,2007)pp.219-223. 
See also.Larry Diamond, “Why China's 
Democratic Transition Will Differ from 
Taiwan's”, in Political Change in China: 
Comparison with Taiwan, edited by Bruce 
Gilley and Larry Diamond(Boulder,CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2008), pp.243-245.
226 Richard C.Bush, “Hong Kong : Examining the 
Impact of the Umbrella Movement”, Brookings 
B r i e f ,  D e c e m b e r  3 r d ,  2 0 1 4 ,  
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/
2014/12/03-hong-kong-umbrella-movement-
bush.
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aggresively demanded for the democracy 
through the Tiananmen Tragedy in 1989, this 
loose movement indirectly reflects the 
st mainland China's 21 century generation's 
reluctance to transform their nation into a 
democratic state, despite of any limited access 
of information or Beijing government's forte 
227in publicity.
Fourth, democratic peace theory is 
quite disenchanting for the case of China. The 
theory argues that democracies are more 
peaceful only in their relations with other 
democracies since they will not go to war with 
228 one another. Political specialists have 
vividly construed this idea to China that 
beyond internal change, the democracy could 
also be a solution to some of China's foreign 
policy troubles, as China's neighbors do not 
trust Beijing and harbor deep suspicion 
towards China's intentions and foreign policy 
229aims.  In fact, it is far-fetched, but China's 
economic power has proved its grandiosity 
over democracy, as it has successfully 
converted the European Union (henceafter, 
“EU”) interests, which initially required 
China to uphold the human rights, into a 
strategic partnership –  that shows the EU's 
intentions in pursuing interests with China 
that are of mutual benefit and subsided the 
230 issue of human rights.
Many scholars have attempted to 
predict the future of democracy in China. A 
case in point to the question should not be  
'will or not', instead it would be more 
challenging to further ask ourselves, “Why 
has the government, to this day, continued to 
embrace authoritarianism and why do the 
Chinese people continue to believe in the 
legitimacy of its government?. How have 
227 In 1989, unarmed students took to Tiananmen 
Square to call for government accountability, 
freedom of press and other pro-democracy 
causes. They were met by China's People's 
Liberation Army, which shot automatic gunfire 
into the crowd. See more. Albert Chang, 
“Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident,” 
Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol.5, 
No.1, (2005), pp.9-12.
228 This idea of democratic peace  dates back 
centuries, at least to Immanuel Kant and other 
18th-century Enlightenment thinkers. On the 
empirical side, some propose that democracies 
are more peaceful in their relations with all 
other states in the system (“monadic” 
democratic peace); some propose that 
democracies are more peaceful only in their 
relations with other democracies (“dyadic” 
democratic peace).
229 Edward Friedman and Barrett L.McCormick, 
What if China D o e s n ' t  D e m o c r a t i z e ? :  
Implications for War and Peace, ( L o n d o n :  
Routledge, 2015), pp.5-6.
230 Katinka Barysch, Charles Grant, and Mark 
Leonard, “Embracing the Dragon : The EU's 
partnership with China”, Center for European 
Reform, 2011, pp.3-4.
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authoritarian policies won the hearts of its 
people? Why are the powerful democratic 
countries unable to impose China to adopt 
democratic values, as they have done in 
countries like Myanmar and Zimbabwe?”. 
The aim of this paper is to explore and 
examine the factors that contribute to the 
durability of China's authoritarian regime by 
taking the historical and institutional 
approaches into account, in accordance with 
the constructivist perspective. This paper also 
uses stastical data to analyze further the 
ultimate determinant that correlates the 
importance of democracy in the eyes of 
Chinese citizens. Therefore, the remainder of 
this paper is summarized as follows : Section 1 
will review the history of electoral democracy 
in China in order to identify why public 
support for democracy in the present day is not 
strong ; Section 2 discusses the absence of 
external power in influencing China's 
democracy and the internal power of CCP ; 
Section 3 will look at the relationship between 
the CCP and the middle class, an actor which 
has traditionally been a force of change in 
society ; and Section 4 concludes the main 
findings. 
The Historical Perspective : Incomplete 
Legacy?  
While discussing the paths that China 
takes towards development, President Xi 
Jinping has firmly said in a speech delivered 
during a visit to Europe in 2014, “You know if 
the shoe fits only if you try it on yourself. Only 
the Chinese people have the right to say 
whether China's development path is 
231 correct.” This Xi's new narrative is basically 
highlighting two important message to the 
world. First, there will be no liberalisation 
under Xi and his party, the ruling CCP, and 
there was no such thing as “universal values” 
(such as freedom, democracy and human 
rights). People's democracy is the life of 
socialism, and developing socialist 
democracy is the unswerving goal of the 
232nation and  CCP.   Second, the party should 
231 John Ruwitch, “Xi Jinping says multi-party 
system didn't work for China”, Reuters, April 
n d2 ,  2 0 1 4 ,  h t t p : / / i n . r e u t e r s . c o m /  
a r t i c l e /2014 /04 /02 /ch ina-po l i t i c s -x i -
jinping- idINDEEA3101U20140402 .
232 In building socialist democracy, China has 
always adhered to the basic principle of 
combining the Marxist theory of d e m o c r a c y  
with the realities of China, assimilated the 
democratic elements of its traditional culture 
and institutional civilization, and borrowed 
from the achievements of other societies. 
People's democratic system was adopted in the 
first PRC Constitution in 1954. 
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be proud of itself and have confidence in its 
historical right to rule. Tracing back the 
history, Xi with his 'shoe' analogy is logically 
acceptable, considering China with its 5,000 
years civilization had considered and adopted 
many political system, from constitutional 
m o n a r c h y,  i m p e r i a l  r e s t o r a t i o n ,  
parliamentarism, a multi-party system, and a 
republican system, but none worked, except 
for the current authoritarian regime under the 
233CCP. 
The historical findings show that China 
had taken democracy into consideration and 
even adopted it – simply justifying Xi's 
message. The democratization was incubated 
in the late Qing period (1840 AD – 1911 AD) 
and took shape in the Republican period (1912 
234 thAD – 1949 AD).  Until the mid 19  century, 
the Qing Dynasty and its elites had strongly 
believed that China was supreme in the 
civilized world, while all foreign countries 
were barbarian. At that time, there was a 
tributary relationship between Qing and 
foreigners. Once a foreign ruler agreed to pay 
tribute to the Emperor in Beijing, he explicitly 
acknowledged that Chinese civilization was 
the most advanced in the world, and the 
Confucian system with the Emperor at its 
235heart, was the core culture.  However, the 
self-confident was gradually turned into 
deepening humiliation by China's consecutive 
military defeats – starting from China's first 
unequal treaty signed with the United 
Kingdom after its defeat in the Sino-British 
Opium War in 1842, while Hong Kong was 
handed over to British control and 
simultaneously culminating in its crushing 
defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894-1895. As the result, these sequential 
events were the watershed of China's 
236 democratization.
Accordingly, based on the belief that 
“Japan has taken the West's excellence in 
edcuation as its model in fostering nation and 
its people”, Qing government abruptly 
2 3 3Ren Jingjing, “China's democracy to 
prosperity”, China Daily, May 30th, 2015, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-
05/30/content_17552856.htm. 
2 3 4Kerry Brown, “Assessing Democracy 
Assistance : China”, Project Report under 
United Nations Democracy Fund and Taiwan 
Foundation for Democracy, May 2010, p.2.
235 Kim Kwong Chan and Alan Hunter, “Religion, 
Culture, and Confucius Institutes in China's 
Foreign Policy”, in The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Chinese Foreign Policy , 
edited by E.Kavalski, Farnham : Ashgate, 2012, 
pp. 135-136.
236 Bruce Gilley, China's Democractic Future : How 
It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead, (New 
York : Columbia University Press, 2005), 
pp.243-244.
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abolished the 1,200 years old-civil service 
examination in 1905 and replace it with a 
three-tiar modern school system of primary 
schools, secondary schools, and colleges – a 
system modeled on that of Westernized Japan 
237during Meiji Restoration.  Thus, one 
unexpected results of education reforms 
during late period of Qing, was the declining 
optimism in Confucianism and the further 
motivation of many Chinese elites to learn 
Western democracy as a means to build China 
238 into a powerful modern state.
The word “democracy” or minzhu is 
relatively new in Chinese. It was introduced to 
China by an elite reformer, Liang Qichao in 
1889 and in the early 1900s, democracy had 
the same meaning as it did in the West. The 
optimistic view of democracy was “a means 
of communication between people and 
government” which could effectively unleash 
the power of public participation in aimed to 
establish the unity of will and effort of 
individuals and to promote the collective 
239 welfare. Consequently, the democracy 
would secure the survival of China from 
Western imperialism. This idea was 
developed into the electoral democracy, 
which stipulated in the Qing's 'Provincial 
Assembly Regulations' and 'Provincial 
240Assembly Election Regulations'.
The first Chinese experiment with 
elections was in 1909. The law restricted 
suffrage to the adult men who held the proper 
educational, social, or economic credentials  
and  limited the right to vote to male Chinese 
nationals over the age of twenty-five who 
were living in their province of ancestral 
residence and had either : (1) managed a 
public welfare organization ; (2) earned a 
degree from Western style middle school ; (3) 
held the higher degree than recently abolished 
civil service examination system ; (4) held a 
position in the civil or military bureaucracy ; 
237 Civil services examination was initially 
instituted as an empire-wide education 
institution by China's imperial rulers in the Sui 
Dynasty (581 AD – 618 AD). The original 
purpose of the system was to limit alternative 
center of power, mainly the landed aristocracy. 
In the Song Dynasty (260 AD – 1279 AD), the 
landed aristocracy was permanently replaced by 
a new class of “scholar-officials” who were 
exclusively selected through civil service 
examination where the examinees' mastery of 
the Confucian classic was tested. 
238 op.cit, p.12.
239 Lawrence R.Sullivan, Leadership and Authority 
in China 1895-1976, (New York : Rowman and 
Littlefield , 2012) pp.12-13.
240 Joshua Hill, “Voter Education : Provincial 
Autonomy and the Transformation of Chinese 
Election Law”, East Asian History and Culture 
Review, No.7, 2013, pp.9-10.
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(5) owned a minimum of 5,000 yuan of real 
estate or commercial capital. Several 
occupations were also barred from 
participations, such as government officials, 
police, active duty soliders, monks, and 
students, as well as the mentally disordered 
241and those using opium.  This indirect 
election was carried out within two stage of 
election process. First, voters did not directly 
elect representatives but instead voted for an 
intermediate group of electors who would 
then be responsible for the final selection. 
Second, the winner of the election determined 
by a mathematical formula would run for the 
secondary stage election and then become the 
242 new provincial assemblymen.
After Qing dynasty collapsed, this 
fundamental structure of Qing electoral law 
was adopted by the new government of the 
Republic of China under Sun Yat Sen's 
leadership. The indirect system was still 
maintained but there were number of 
243revisions on voters' conditions.  Adult men at 
least twenty-one years of age who had lived in 
the same voting district for at least two years, 
and either 1) had graduated from a Western-
style primary school , 2) owned 500 yuan or 
more in real estate, 3) paid annual direct taxes 
to the central government in excess of 2 yuan. 
It laid the groundwork for a sizeable 
expansion of the electorate from the fewer 
than two milion persons in 1909 to nearly 
244 forty-three million in 1912.
Unfortunately, this electoral democracy 
left the traumatic experiences among Chinese. 
In the national elections held in Febuary 1913 
for the new bicameral parliament, Song 
Jiaoren (Sun Yat Sen's associaties) under the 
flagship of Kuomingtang (henceafter, 
“KMT”)  or Nationalist Party won a majority 
of seats. Yuan Sikai, the Qing's officials, had 
Song assasinated in March and this was 
followed by assassination of several pro-
revolution generals. In turn, the KMT was 
dissolved and widespread rebellions ensued, 
leading the nation to break up into warlord 
fractions, and numerous provinces declared 
245  independence.241 Ibid, pp.10-11.
242 Ibid, p.22.
243Jamie P.Horsley, “Development of Electoral 
Democracy in China”, in Understanding 
China's Legal System : Essays in Honor of 
Jerome A.Cohen, edited by C. Stephen 
Hsu,(New York : NYU Press, 2003), pp.323-
324.
244 William A.Joseph, Politics in China : An 
Introduction, (London : Oxford University 
Press, 2014), pp. 52-54.
245 Ibid, pp.55-58.
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Few years later, political elites had been 
courageously struggling for democratization 
in China. By the early 1920s, Sun Yat Sen 
reestablished the KMT and decided to push 
his party to thoroughly repudiate the 1912 
consitutional system and its electoral laws. To 
replace it, the Nationalist advocated universal 
adult suffrage, as well as addressing Four 
Rights of People – the right to vote, the right to 
recall, the power of intiative, and the power of 
referendum. On May 5, 1936 , the Nanjing 
government promulgated a draft consitution 
after years of negotiation, revision, and 
controversy. This constitution envisioned the 
election of a National Assembly selected 
through an election process, that would be 
“universal, equal, direct, and based on a secret 
ballot”. The general election was scheduled 
246for July 1937.  
Nevertheless, the democracy was not 
about to give its place in China. The window 
of opportunity to protect the Republic of 
China and support nationalist party ideologies 
was unexpectedly diminished. A skirmish 
between Chinese and Japanese forces at the 
Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing on July 7, 
began a crisis that led to the two countries' 
247 final slide into war. The elections were 
abandoned in the midst of a fight for national 
survival. Furthermore, where the general 
election were held from late November 1947 
to early January 1948, it was largely contested 
by the CCP,which  led to war and the exodus 
248of KMT to Taiwan.
At first glance, Chinese experiences in 
electoral democracy may appear to be nothing 
more than a footnote in twentieth century 
history  However, the bloodsheed experiences 
on democracy have produced the distinct 
legacy for the government and its people as a 
system that is incompatible with China's 
complex society and politics.   First, none of 
th stChina's 20  and 21  century leaders could ever 
claim to rule by an electoral mandate, as they 
may believe that electoral democracy will not 
198
247 Robert Weatherley, Making China Strong: The 
Role of Nationalism in Chinese Thinking on 
Democracy and Human Rights (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p.100.
248 Taiwan and mainland China had been seperated 
for over six decades since the ending of the 
Chinese Civil War in 1949, since then the two 
sides lifted the ban on travel and trade toward the 
end of 1980s. However, by the end of 2010, the 
cross-Strait relations on economics and cultural 
exchange has rapidly proliferated into a 
torrential flow. 
246 Chung Gi Kwai, The Kuomintang-Communist 
Struggle in China 1922-1949, ( New York : 
Springer Science & Business Media, 2012), 
pp.24-28.
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work in China, and may either lead to the 
turmoil and coup d'etat or the emergence of 
incompetent leaders. This has also been 
apparently predicted by Liang Qichao. Before 
the end of Qing over China, Liang's 
enthusiasm about democracy which obtained 
during his exile in Japan, was dramatically 
changed into scepticism after his direct 
exposure in US' democracy. Unimpressed by 
the talent of American politicians and 
deploring the inefficiency of elections, as well 
as observing that Chinese diaspora 
participation in US election and organization 
had always led to chaos and disorder, Liang 
optimically defended for the authoritarianism 
as a necessary means to build China into a 
249 modern state. In his post-American tour 
essay, On Enlightened Despotism, Liang 
exquisitely describes the democracy's 
incompatibility to Chinese's conditions : 
“Were we now to resort the rule – 
F r e e d o m ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m ,  
Republicanism – it would be the same 
as committing national suicide. Those 
things would be like wearing summer 
grab in winter or furs in summer : 
beautiful without doubt, but unsuitable. 
The Chinese people must for now 
accept authoritarian rule ; they cannot 
250enjoy freedom.”
Liang's narrative is admittable by reviewing 
how Qing Dynasty collapsed only six years 
after the abolition of civil service examination, 
a system that had endorsed the “ non-
heriditary”肖 ess in examination for 1,200 
years – was replaced by the bloodsheed out 
of electoral democracy. As the result, 
meritocracy is preferred as a means to choose 
state officials, over electoral democracy 
which until this day, is still favored amongst 
Chinese citizen (would be discussed on the 
251 next chapter).
Second, China's current political 
condition might be perceived as an 
incomplete legacy of what Sun Yat Sen has 
predicted before. Early 1920s, Sun strongly 
believed that the people of China would 
require a period of time in which they were 
trained to exercise democracy. This period 
was called 'Three Stages of Revolution'. At 
the very first phase, there would be nothing 
250 Liang Qichao, “Kaiming Zhuanzhi Lun (On 
Enlightened Despotism)”, in Liang Qichao 
Quanji (Complete Works of Liang Qichao) 
Vol.3, 1999, Beijing Chubanshe.
251 Daniel A.Bell, The China Model: Political 
Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy, (New 
Jersey : Princeton University Press, 2015), 
pp.54-56.
199
249 Zhao Suisheng, China and Democracy: 
Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic 
China, (London: Routledge, 2014), p.41.
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less than a dictatorship to diminish 
completely the old form of imperial 
government. Second stage was regarded as 
“political tutelage”while the state would still 
be a military autocracy but the people would 
be trained to understand democracy, by 
allowing them to obtain the regional 
automony. The third stage will see the 
strengthening of democratic institutions and 
the dismantling of military autocracy. Each 
county having achieved complete local self- 
government would elect one delegate. A 
national congress consisting of the total 
number of the elected delegates would then 
draft the constitution. After this, the people 
would elect a president and parliamentary 
delegates  to  organize  the  cent ra l  
252 government.
Prior to 1949, China had reached the end 
of the first phase and would embark on the 
second stage. However, the Nationalist 
attempts to institutionalize idea origination in 
the provincial autonomy movement were 
failed, but its legacies had bear fruit after 1949 
in Taiwan. Meanwhile, the People's Republic 
of China (henceafter, “ PRC”) has 
continuously been maintaining the second 
stage and might not progress the third phase, 
as its homegenous populations do not have 
much offers, interests, and expectations 
despite of wealth and prosperity. 
Weak Opposition to CCP Rule
Ta i w a n ' s  e x p e r i e n c e s  h a v e  
demonstrated that it is possible for a 
hegemonic party to engineer a peaceful and 
gradual transition away from one party 
authoritarianism on the basis of a sucessful 
record of economic modernization, in which 
democracy finally emerges. It is also 
agreeable to recall Taiwan's success in 
consolidating democracy as a means to justify 
the possible existence of democracy in PRC , 
due to its 'Chinese-ness'. The people of 
Taiwan in their daily lives have preserved and 
practiced Chinese social customs ; dietary 
habits; notions of life, death, fate and the 
supernatural ; and family-based ethicsm – 
simply proved their Chinese-ness is 
253compatible with the values of democracy.
200
252 Fu Zhengyuan, Autocratic Tradition and 
Chinese Politics, (United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), pp.152-153.
253 Taiwan is considered as the first and only 
democracy in a culturally Chinese society. See 
more. Yun-Han Chu, “China and East Asian 
Democracy : The Taiwan Factor”, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol.23 No.1, January 2012, pp.42-
56.
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Beside that, from the government side, 
at the intial path of development, both Taiwan 
(KMT) and CCP emerged with the aims of 
rebuilding state and society out of the ashes of 
imperial China and saving the nation from 
predatory imperialist power. As self-
proclaimed rulers of China, a nationalist 
KMT, and socialist CCP, both superimposed 
themselves onto the state and society, 
establishing institutional hegemony. Along 
with the advancement, KMT had benefited 
from the state's export-led industrialization 
strategy, since Chiang Ching Kuo, the second 
generation of Taiwan leadership, built up 
Taiwan through ambitious projects and 
deviated from the classisc Leninist model, 
which finally contributed to the consolidation 
254of democracy.  On the other hand, by tracing 
its grandiosity on economic achievement, 
CCP has also almost drawn closer to those 
kind of regime transition. Yet, while recent 
aspects of modernization might accommodate 
democracy to thrive, all in all, the current 
regime will not allow it. 
Against this background, China seems 
to do very well. At an average of 9 percent 
growth per year over the past sixteen years, 
the Chinese economy was the fastest growing 
in the world; market reform had been 
deepening; foreign investment continues to 
pour in allowing large amounts of Chinese 
products to be exported. Much of the booming 
economy and increasing bargaining power, of 
courses hinges upon the CCP's grip on power 
255 in China. However, beyond this long-
standing authoritarian regime, there are two 
main key factors that both internally and 
externally provide a comparative benchmark 
for China to just ify the value of 
authoritarianism, which also can bring 
prosperity to its people as well as procuring 
the framework to deal with democratic and 
non-democratic governement. 
(1) The absence of constructive 
engagement 
The idea of constructive engagement 
originated during the administration of 
American President, Ronald Reagan to 
255 Malcolm Cook, “China's Power Status : East 
Asian Challenges for Xi Jinping's Foreign 
Policy”, China Quarterly of International 
Strategic Studies, Vol.1, No.1, p.105.
201
254 Bruce J. Dickson, “Dilemmas for Party 
Adaptation: the CCP's Strategies for 
Survival,”in., State and Society in 21st-Century 
China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation 
edited by Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen 
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 
141–158.
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describe his approach towards South Africa. It 
emphasized intergovernmental cooperation, 
lending South Africa financial resources to 
foster its economic development, and 
repudiating the use of sanctions to punish 
South Africa for its apartheid policy. In doing 
so, the economic reforms would produce 
larger middle class and the societal pressure to 
stimulate the gradual change of political 
256reform.
This normative intention has ever been 
developed to engage with China as well by 
European Union, though recent economic 
concerns took precedent over EU's normative 
goals on China. According to the 1995 
strategy, the EU's first objective was to 
“socialise China into the kind of international 
order that the EU supports”, which includes 
support for the UN, adherence to international 
agreements on the environment, and the fight 
against the proliferation of nuclear and other 
257 weapons. The EU's second objective 
therefore is to help China's internal transition. 
It vows to work with China in many practical 
ways, including progress towards full 
integration in the world market economy, 
strengthening of civil society, poverty 
alleviation, environment protection, human 
resource development, scientific and 
technological development, information 
society, trade and investment co-operation. 
They fork out millions of euro to help China's 
transition; and they foster trust through 
political dialogues, joint military exercises or 
258human rights projects.  But on the other 
hand, Chinese authorities have become rather 
good at exploiting commercial rivalries for 
political purposes. Further, Beijing can be 
tough and determined at the negotiating table. 
As the result, the EU's day-to-day dealings 
with China are not systematically linked to 
259those objectives anymore.  Indeed, China's 
257 Katinka Barysch, Charles Grant, and Mark 
Leonard, “Embracing the Dragon : The EU's 
partnership with China”, pp.6-7.
258 Ibid, p.8.
259 Sophie Meunier, “Political Impact of Chinese 
Foreign Direct Investment in the European 
Union on Transatlantic Relations”, European 
Parliament Briefing Paper, 4 May 2012, 
P r i n c e t o n  U n i v e r s i t y ,  p p .  6 - 7 ,  
http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/
meunier_final_0.pdf.
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256 Other democratic countries in the past have also 
attempted to use constructive engagement to 
approach authoritarian states, such as Prime 
Minister of Canada, Jean Chretien who urged 
Cuba's government to effectively support 
movement in Cuba towards a peaceful transition 
for respresentative governments, human rights, a 
more open economy, and  reintegration into the 
Western Hemisphere. See more. Robert A. 
Manning, “Constructive Engagement; South 
Africa: Why Leon Sullivan gave up his 
'Principles'.” U.S. News & World Report ,  15 
June 1987.
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strong bargaining power in negotiating table 
with democratic nations, has successfully 
converted the intention of contructive 
engagement into strategic partnership without 
taking the sensitive issues such as freedom 
and human rights into account. 
For all reasons, due to its status as a 
permanent member of the UN Security 
Council, there is no way for US and its allies to 
impose the human rights sanctions toward 
China. In turn, China has often used its status 
as one of veto power holder to try and block 
initiatives for intervention, especially within 
260the cases of human rights violations.  On the 
one side, its veto power diminishes any 
normative intention to transform CCP's 
authoritarian soul into a democratic one. On 
the other hand, this is the core part of how 
China itself has more promising deals with 
other non-democratic regime (such as 
Myanmar) to exert the constructive 
engagement. Its expansionist influence has 
been encouraging economic and political 
investment in Myanmar. As a reply, Myanmar 
will geopolitically protect China's interest in 
regional (ASEAN) and China will maintain 
the asymetric dependency by using its veto 
power in UN Security Council to block 
initiatives for Responsibility to Protect toward 
Myanmar as well as strengthening its 
fundamental policy of Principle of Peaceful 
261 Coexistence.
In the regional level, the absence of 
constructive engagement can be seen through 
ASEAN. The Southeast Asia's proximity to 
China offers a valuable explanation for the 
persistence of the authoritarian rule, 
particularly in Myanmar and Cambodia. 
China has purpotedly taken particular interest 
through closer economic engagement. In 
doing so, on the one side, the constructive 
engagement toward Myanmar by ASEAN to 
gradually transform the nation into 
democratic one is less meaningful than the 
asymetric engagement between China and 
Myanmar. On the other hand, there is also 
261 From 1954 until this present, China's decisions 
of foreign policy derives from the Five 
Principles of  Peaceful Coexistence, comprising 
: (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, (2) mutual non-aggression, 
(3) non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs , (4) equality and mutual benefit, (5) 
peaceful coexistence.
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great difficulty for some Western powers, 
such as US, to encourage the strengthening of 
democracy in China through multilateral 
organizations, particularly ASEAN, which 
prioritizes the principle of non-interference 
262 that stipulated in ASEAN Charter 2008.
(2) Meritrocracy produces more 
accountable government than 
democracy does.
Larry Diamond in The Spirit of 
Democracy has argued that democratic 
consolidation should be seen as taking place 
in two dimensions namely normative and 
behavorial, and at three levels, comprising 
political elites, political organization (such as 
parties, movement and civic organization), 
a n d  t h e  m a s s  p u b l i c .  H o w e v e r ,  
democratization faces some stumbles in 
China, as it falls short of consolidation at the 
political elites ( and also the mass public 
which would be discussed at the next sub-
263 chapter).
In Japan and South Korea, the 
emergence of constitutional institutions 
predated the shift towards democracy. Again, 
it was the existence of a strong state to build 
those institutions that prevented countries 
f rom devolving into  the  e lectoral  
264autocracies.  In contrast, China is a 
liberalising autocracy that uses meritocracy to 
produce more accountable government rather 
than pushing for the advancement of a 
democratic regime. Meritocracy is used by the 
CCP as a means for it to deliver the needs of its 
people while ensuring that its own power is 
265 preserved.
Without much fanfare,  Beijing has 
introduced significant reforms into its way of 
governance and established an elaborate 
system of what can be called “selection plus 
election”, or familiarly as meritocracy to 
replace the electoral democracy. There are 
three underlying reasons for reviving and 
reinterpreting this political ideal within a 
Chinese context. First, political meritocracy 
has been a basic theme in the history of 
264   Ibid, p.29.
265 Daniel A.Bell, The China Model: Political 
Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy, 
pp.63-65.
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Chinese polical culture, and continues to be 
central to its real politics. As a civilized state 
that strongly holds the value of Confucianism, 
the political meritocracy is the decent answer 
of how to elevate 'the worthiness' within the 
266 policial practices and institutions.
Second, based on the aforementioned 
historical findings, the democracy, especially 
the Western style, is a flawed political system 
and meritocracy is one of best alternative to 
remedy some of its imperfections. It provides 
the platform that assuming everybody should 
be educated. In doing so, an important task of 
the political system is to select leaders with an 
above average ability to make morally 
informed political judgement, as well as to 
encourage as many talents cadre to participate 
in politics, instead of holding elections 
267  without any promising competencies.
Third, the CCP itself has become more 
meritocratic organization over the last three 
decades or so.  It is also undeniable fact that 
China's dramatic rise over the past three 
decades is inseparable from this meritocratic 
268 system.
As well as how Qing Dynasties had 
influenced the political system in current 
China, this idea is also inherited from the 
previous dynasties in ancient China. The 
political meritocracy was institutionalized by 
means of the imperial examination system 
that put successful candidates on the path to 
fame and power. Furthermore, this system is 
269  continuously inherited by CCP to this day.
Given by the fact, as defined by Shi Tianjian 
and Lu Jie, since the last decades, this 
mechanism also initiates the “guardianship 
discourse” among governement and Chinese 
people. The majority of Chinese people 
endorses “guardianship discourse”, to 
identify high quality politicians who care 
about the people's demands, take people's 
interests into consideration during decision 
making process, and issue the good policies 
270  on behalf of their people and society.
Since the last three decades, the CCP's 
268 Daniel A.Bell, China's New Confucianism: 
Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing 
Society, p.10.
269Benjamin A.Elman, Civil Examinations and 
Meritocracy in Late Imperial China, (Boston: 
Harvard University Press, 2013), pp.1-3.
270 Shi Tianjian and Lu Jie, “The Battles of Ideas 
and Discourses Before Democratic Transition: 
Different Democratic Conceptions in 
Authoritarian China”, International Political 
Science Review, Vol.36, No.1, 2014, p.23.
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Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing 
Society, (New Jersey : Princeton University 
Press, 2010), p.2-3.
267Kerry Dumbaugh, Understanding China's 
Political System, (Pennsylvania: Diane 
Publishing, 2010), p.6.
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focus has shifted to the task of good 
governance led by reliable and virtuous 
political leaders, the selection and promotion 
mechanisms of the CCP have become more 
meritocratic. In the 1980s, talented students 
were reluctant to join the CCP and most of 
them were the provocators of Tiananmen 
tragedy in 1989 which demanded democracy 
and a more liberal China. Ironically, it is a 
different story today. College campuses are 
the main sources of promising cadres for CCP. 
Number of top schools like Tsinghua 
University, 28 percents of all undergraduate 
students, 43 percent of graduate seniors and 
up to 55 percents of graduate student were 
271CCP members in 2010.
Interestingly, although China never 
claims itself as the democracy state, but there 
is an element of democracy found within the 
system, namely transparency.  It is hard not be 
impressed by the rigorous selection process 
for the higher levels of government officials. 
For example, the Secretary General of the 
Organization Department of the CPC Central 
272Committee.  The selected procedure is tough 
but explicitly promising for the sake of future 
of nations and the people. First, there is a 
nomination process, not only for the 
candidate, but also for the retired cadres. 
Those who received many nominations could 
move to the next stage. Second, there is an 
examination. To guarantee that the process 
runs fairly, the examination papers would be 
put in the corridor so that public can judge the 
result. There is also the oral examination with 
an interview panel comprising ministers, 
vice-ministers, and university professors. The 
transparancy is ensured by the attendance of 
ordinary staffs who work for the General 
Secretary, to supervise process throughoutly. 
Three candidates with the highest score are 
selected for the next stage and will be checked 
by personnel department to aseess his/her 
performance and virtue. The final result is 
determined by the committee consisting of 12 
ministers who each has a vote, and the 
recommended candidates require two-third 
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majority to be passed. This is how the 
meritocracy is perceived by China as a means 
to guarantee the rights of its people in 
expecting the talented and reliable 'guardian' 
by delegating the vote through the 
performance assessment and decision of 
273aforementioned 12 ministers.
Zhang Wei Wei, an infamous author of 
The China Wave : Rise of a Civilizational 
State, sarcatically illustrates that, with the 
meritocratic governance of China, it is 
inconceivable that people as weak and 
incompetent as George W.Bush or Yoshihiko 
Noda of Japan could ever get to the top 
274leadership position.  Xi Jinping can be 
epitomized. Before appointed as the 
Chairman of CCP and the President of PRC, 
Xi Jinping served as the governor of Fujian 
Province, a region known for its dynamic 
economy and as party secretary of Zhejing 
province which is acknowledged for its 
rapidly growing private sector, and Shanghai, 
China's financial heart and business hub with 
a powerful state-sector. These experiences in 
fact proved the quality of Xi to manage area 
with total population of over 120 million and 
an economy larger than India's. He was then 
given another chance to serve as vice 
president under Hu Jintao's administration to 
understand the state and military affairs both 
275at national and international level.  
On the side of continuity with the past, 
although CCP is still a selective political elite 
consisting of about 8 percent of the 
population, but it embraces the unbeatable 
commitment to maintain the best qualities of 
political elites. The CCP regime is 
unencumbered by the kind of institutional and 
ideological  commitments  tha t  had 
constrained the KMT. The CCP has also 
committed itself to the development of 
“socialist democracy” which irreplaceable by 
other form of government to pursue the nation 
276 wealth. Party members answer to tight 
political discipline from the party leadership 
in Beijing and remained accountable. As said 
by Prime Minister Li Keqiang, "Holding 
207
273  Ibid. 
2 7 4 Zhang Weiwei, “Meritocracy versus 
Democracy”, New York Times, November 9th, 
2 0 1 2 ,  h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m /  
2012/11/10/opinion/meritocracy-versus-
democracy.html?_r=0.
275 Ibid.
276C.Fred Bergsten, et al., China's Rise : Challenges 
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down a job without doing a stroke of work and 
accomplishing nothing is a typical example of 
official corruption, and these officials should 
277be held responsible”.
Indeed, in the Beijing's point of view, 
Abraham Lincoln's ideal of “government of 
the people, by the people, and for the people” 
does not meet the objectives of Chinese 
people who substantially requiring the 'good' 
governance (in their definition), competent 
leadership, and capable in satisfying the 
citizenry,  instead of electoral democracy that 
might hardly produces the “best from the 
best” political candidate for 'representing' 
278people's  rights.
Lack of Willingness to Support Democracy 
Amongst Citizenry
In 1989, Tiananmen square protest 
galvanising students,  workers,  and 
intellectual across China confronted the 
authoritarian rule. They were lacked the right 
to vote, could not freely criticize the 
government and faced restrictions on whom 
they could worship. Human rights was at stake 
and China's press was under the strict 
supervision of the government and promoted 
no viewpoints in opposition to CCP power. 
Idealistic language about 'centralized 
democracy' was seen as empty sloganeering. 
Twenty-six years later, apparently the Chinese 
still cannot vote for national leaders, or even 
freely criticise the government. The condition 
has worsened as number of social media are 
blocked and many intellectual and activists 
who against the CCP administration (for 
instead, Falun Gong) had been jailed without 
any toleration. The expectation that more 
wealth in China would lead to more 
democracy, has been frustated as the one-
279party rule still persists.
Thus, this is an interesting fact to be 
raised. The world simply demands China for 
being democratized, while contradictively the 
citizens do not always draw the same stark 
c o n t r a s t  b e t w e e n  d e m o c r a t i c  a n d  
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authoritarian regimes that political scientists 
normally do. Many Chinese now feel pride in 
the  CCP's  model  of  au thor i ta r ian  
development, as they are simply forgetting 
how the Tiananmen tragedy killings showed 
the people's army and CCP could open fire on 
the people themselves. All in all, there are 
some determinants within Chinese's 
perception that has been benefited the long-
standing power of CCP. 
(1) The common trust and confidence to 
government 
Over the last decades, how PRC's 
citizens trust their political institution more 
highly than citizens do in countries whose 
political systems are democratized, are 
seemingly indestructable. This is proven by 
the quantitative findings issued by East Asian 
280 Barometer (EAB). The research conducted 
national random survey in 2002 in five new 
democracies (Mongolia, Philippines, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand), one 
established democracy (Japan), one quasi 
280 The Asian Barometer (ABS) is an applied 
research program on public opinion on 
political values, democracy, and governance 
around the region.
Source : Eric C. Chang and Yun-han Chu,
 “Regime Performance and Support for 
Democratization”, Working Paper Series No.7, 
Asian Barometer, http://www.asianbarometer.org/
newenglish/publications/workingpapers/no.7.pdf
Table 1 : 
The Level of Support for Democracy 
in 2002 (%)
d e m o c r a c y  ( H o n g k o n g ) ,  a n d  o n e  
authoritarian system (China). Among these 
eight political system, public satisfaction with 
the regime is surprisingly highest in 
authoritarian China, lowest in democratic 
Japan and Taiwan, and fragile in the other new 
281democracies.  The survey asked five 
questions to estimate the level of support for 
democracy (as shown in  Table 1).
281 Yun-Han Chu, et al., “Asia's Challenged 
Democracies”, The Washington Quaterly, 
Vol.32, No.1, January 2009, pp.144-146. For 
the methodology and full findings of the 
firstwave surveys, see Yun-han Chu et al., eds., 
How East Asians View Democracy (NewYork: 
Columbia University Press, 2008).
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Democracy is... China Hong 
Kong
Japan Mongolia Philippines South
Korea
Taiwan Thailand
Desirable for our 
country now*
Suitable for our 
country now*
Effective in solving 
the problems of so-
ciety 
Preferable to all 
other kinds of gov-
ernment 
Equally or more im-
portant than devel-
opment 
None of the above
All of the above
Mean number of 
items supported
NOTES
* 6 or above on a ten-point dictatorship-democracy scale of where the country should or could be now.
   Dichotomous variable.
   Trichotomous variable recoded into a dichotomous variable.
   Five-way variable recoded intto dichotomous variable.
72.3
67.0
60.5
53.8
40.3
13.6
17.8
2.9
87.6
66.8
39.0
40.3
19.6
7.2
7.0
2.5
87.1
76.3
61.4
67.2
44.0
5.7
23.4
3.4
91.6
86.3
78.4
57.1
48.6
1.4
25.9
3.6
88.1
80.2
60.7
63.6
21.8
1.5
6.7
3.1
95.4
84.2
71.7
49.4
30.1
0.7
15.7
3.3
72.2
59.0
46.8
40.4
23.5
13.0
7.4
2.4
93.0
88.1
89.6
82.6
51.3
0.5
35.6
4.0
=
=
In all countries except Taiwan and 
China, the majorities (87 percent or more) 
claimed a desire for democracy by choosing a 
score of 6 or above.  The result also exhibits 
that though the desire of Chinese to live on 
democracy in the future was higher, but they 
have not yet believed that their country was 
ready for it. Especially, in all culturally 
Chinese societies (China PRC itself, 
Hongkong, and Taiwan), a significant number 
was sceptical about the suitability of 
democracy which reflects the influence of 
their common cultural values which primarily 
accentuate the order and harmony as 
emphasized by Confucianism. Respondents 
also seem to greatly suppport development 
over democracy. Across the region, 
particularly China, democracy lost favor to 
economic development by a wide margin. It 
was proven that although PRC's respondents 
prefer to the democracy, but it was not 
perceived as the viable political system which 
able to underpin the economic development 
and prosperity. 
Moreover, compared with the result in 
2002, the EAB recent data obtained in 2006-
2008 is showing a downward trend of support 
for democracy among Chinese people, while 
Taiwan and Hongkong have increased. 
Ironically, 82 percent of Chinese respondents 
believed the nature of the regime had changed 
into a democratic direction since the start of 
Deng Xiaoping's reform in 1979. The 
quantitative data in 2006-2008 also exhibits 
the general stability of idea developed in 2002 
where the level of trust in local institutions 
was lower than in central institutions. The 
survey estimated that 17 percent of 
respondents did not trust the court, 21 percents 
did not trust local government, and 23 percent 
282 did not trust civil servants.  A case in point is, 
this result merely proved two underlying 
factors. Firstly, bearing into mind, people in 
China trusted the political institutions that 
were away from their daily lives more than the 
institutions with which they have regular 
contact. This portrays how the citizen's 
obedience toward central government had 
such been destined since the beginning of 
their civilization, as well as how the Chinese 
mentality that believed the emperor is 'Son of 
God' (as part of Confucianism) during ancient 
282 Shi Tianjian, “China: Democratic Values 
Supporting an Authoritarian System” in Yun-
han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and 
Doh Chull Shin, eds., How East Asians View 
Democracy (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2008), pp. 209–237.
210 Trissia Wijaya, Democracy Deficit in China : A Choice or Foreordained? 
211
283 China, even if the local officials are bad.
Secondly, the Chinese respondents are in 
favor with the current regime since their own 
conceptions are embarked from distinctive 
benchmark,  namely Mao Zedong 's  
leadership.  The Cultural Revolution carried 
out during Mao Zedong's regime was more 
miserable than the current situation so, 
understandbly, the increase in freedom and 
prosperity which they have enjoyed since 
post-Mao's leadership is seen as a form of 
democratization and considered as a better 
 284way of life (as summarized in Table 2).
Table 2 : Perception of Past and 
Current Regime in China 2008 (in %) 
283 Ibid, p.220.
284 Mao launched the so-called Cultural Revolution 
(known in full as the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution) in August 1966, at a meeting of the 
Plenum of the Central Committee. It led to the 
chaos, where some 1.5 million people were 
killed during the Cultural Revolution, and 
millions of others suffered imprisonment, 
Sources : Tianjian Shi, “China: Democratic Values 
Supporting an Authoritarian System”, p.219
Furthermore, entering the fourth 
generations leadership under President Hu 
Jindao in 2011, despite all the changes and 
continuities, the citizen support toward the 
authoritarian regime unshakebly remained. It 
may seem paradoxical that people living in 
authoritarian political system evaluate their 
regime level of democratic change more 
generously than other who living in real 
democracy, but indeed it is an undeniable fact. 
Ideally, democracy can be considered 
normatively consolidated at the mass level if 
at least 70 percent of the public believe that 
democracy is prefereable than any form of 
government and if no more than 15 percent 
prefer an authoritarian regime. On the 
contrary, as shown in table 3, more than 70 
percent of PRC citizen has stronger 
confidence toward current regime than the 
real democratic regime. More interestingly, 
they even value the democracy term under 
self-made interpretation.
seizure of property, torture or general 
h u m i l i a t i o n .  S e e  m o r e  a t  
http://www.history.com/topics/cultural-
revolution.
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(Percent of respondents)
REGIME TYPES 1970S
REGIME 
MID-1990S
REGIME 
CURRENT
REGIME 
Very dictatorial (1-2)
Somewhat dictatorial (3-5)
Somewhat democratic (6-8)
Very democratic (9-10)
DK/NA
Total
Mean on a 10-point scale
Notes: N=3184.
DK/NA = Don’t know/no answer.
     9.6
  37.1
  17.4
    4.3
  31.6
100.0
4.7
     1.2
  25.6
  38.9
    6.4
  28
100.0
6.1
     1.2
  10.9
  44.5
  18.4
  25.1
100.0
7.2
Source: 2011 ABS III Mainland China Survey (N=3413)
Weighted percentages in cells
Table 1: Regime Support and Endorsement of Democracy
Regime support (Agree or Completerly agree)
Over the long run, our system of governement is capable of 
solving the problems our country faces (RS1)
Thingking in general, I am proud of our system of
government (RS2)
A system like ours, even if it runs into problems, deserves
the people’s support (RS3)
I would rather live under our system of government than 
any other that I can think of (RS4)
Democratic orientation (Agree or Completely Agree)
Democracy may have its problems, but it is still the best
form of government.
75.06%
76.58%
68.12%
76.18%
76.18%
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2) Chinese middle class is a 'product' of 
CCP
Democracy is characterized differently 
by the citizen, especially among middle class, 
as the regime with newly consolidated 
democracy is considered to be vulnerable to 
decay and collapse. The middle class of China 
are open to democracy but they do not possess 
strong confidence of the democratic system, 
since they fear that democracy might harm 
their 'comfort zone' where China's current 
political and economic stability provide a 
better place to live. Even without democracy, 
they have enjoyed the intensification of 
modernization that already visible in the 
285 Benjamin Herscovitch, “The East in 
Authori tar ian:  Why China Wil l  Not  
Democratise”, p.14.
286 Jie Chen and Chunlong Lu, “Democratization 
and the Middle Class in China: The Middle 
Class's Atittudes toward Democracy”, Political 
Research Quarterly Vol.64 No.3, 2 0 1 1 ,  
University of Utah, p.707.
287 Ibid, pp.708-710.
285current region.  Referring to the data 
collected in Beijing, Chengdu, and Xian by 
academics Jie Chen and Chunlong Lu, more 
than 90 percent of Chinese middle class 
support protecting the right to work, 
education, free information, privacy of 
286personal correspondence.  In turn, with kind 
regard of individual rights and freedoms, their 
interest in political rights and freedom is 
'lukewarm'. As much as 75 percent of the 
Chinese middle class think they do not need to 
participate in government decision making, 
and only 25 percent argue multiple parties 
should be able to contest elections. 
Furthermore, 86 percent of middle class 
respect current political system and 83 percent 
believe the CCP represents their interest, even 
though the CCP is seemingly to maintain the 
287absolute power.
What pundits called a 'democratic 
deficit' seems to craft the tranquility among 
Chinese middle class. Undeniably, this is a 
Sources : Jie Lu, “Democratic Conceptions and 
Regime Support among Chinese Citizens”, 
Working Paper Series No.66, Asian Barometer 2012,
 
 
http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/
publications/workingpapers/no.66.pdf
Table 3 : 
Regime Support and Endorsement 
of Democracy
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product of the middle class' dependence on the 
state. China's economic structure today is far 
more state centric and state-dominated than 
China's twenty years ago. The state-owned 
enterprises still occupy the commanding 
heights of the economy and most private firms 
rely on the state actors to ease the resource 
constraints of China's regulated markets. In 
addition, state involvement in decision 
making at the firm level, especially in the 
areas of corporate governance, labor relations, 
and finance, remains a core feature of China's 
state guided capitalism. Accordingly, these 
eventually lead to the circumstances where 
the middle classes' future is tied to the Party, as 
within last few decades, the CCP has been 
providing the middle-class with jobs and 
career opportunities within the state 
288apparatus.  All in all, the CCP has engineered 
the rise of the middle class through 35 years of 
economic reforms. Hence, if Chinese are 
given the opportunity to choose a form of 
government, there is no reason to not choose a 
government much like the CCP which has 
economically fulfilled their needs and 
interests. Meanwhile, although the fact 
displays the overlapping definition among 
Chinese regarding the 'guardianship' 
discourse and liberal democracy discourse, 
but Chinese' optimism might simultaneously 
thrive as long as the economic expansion 
would still provide a powerful rationale for 
the political status quo. 
Conclusion 
One cannot simply put Taiwan as an 
acceptable example for China to pursue the 
democracy. As explained in the previous sub-
chapter, the history has created the Taiwan as 
product of KMT and basically its democratic 
regime is such predicted and prepared by the 
party founder, Sun Yatsen and the leader, 
Chiang Kaisek. On the other hand, the current 
political system of PRC is considerably as a 
product of Qing empire and a kind of remedy 
from the nightmares of the war. Thus, it was 
far less concerned with democratic 
consolidation while the winner were always 
the nationalist, authoritarians, or centralists. 
In the case of China, democracies itself 
are not produced by the development of 
dictatorships, neither by highly educated and 
288 Benjamin Herscovitch, “The East in 
Authori tar ian:  Why China Wil l  Not  
Democratise”, p.16.
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more urbanized societies. Accordingly, 
transitions to democracy are random and is 
dependent on the level of development as well: 
not a single transition to democracy can be 
predicted by the level of development alone. 
Particularly, based on the statistic data, 
Chinese citizens exhibit a tantalizing number 
of their optimisim toward current regime and 
more than 70 percent agree that the 
democracy is not suitable for the country. 
On the other hand, the Chinese 
government is determined to control China's 
development in its own way and to establish 
what it sees as China's rightful place among 
world powers. It is likely to become more 
legitimate while the citizen as explained 
above, is still doubt whether the democracy 
consolidation can endure along with their 
enjoyable development or if it would 
contradictively harm their 'promising' status 
quo. The synthesis of political elites' 
unwillingness and the reluctancies of public to 
consolidate the democracy have been leading 
China to a circumstance called 'democratic 
recession'.
From the historical perspective and the 
cultural embodiement, it is axiomatic to 
assume China has been foreordained to be 
undemocratized, simply by inferencing the 
articial legacy of dynasties leadership in 
ancient China and the bitter experience 
derived from the past attempts of electoral 
democracy. If China has been foreordained to 
become a nation based on dictatorship, there 
was no such way to hit the nail on the head 
regarding the legacy. On the other hand, for 
years now, although the fact itself has 
statistically accentuated the overzealousness 
of its citizen toward current regime, referring 
to the aforementioned analysis, it is possible 
for both government and citizen either to 
maintain the status quo by eliminating the 
liberal democracy in the future or to choose 
the democracy.  However, democracy will 
only be winner over the legacy, if there are 
three elements coming together – a robust 
plurality of citizens, a catalytic event that 
endorses a signal to scattered social forces and 
a momentum to transform the nation, and a 
split in leadership where the CCP is at 
loggerhead.
As sequel of this paper, Alexander 
Fraser Tyler (1770), has ever cited his theory 
about “Cycle of Democracy”, emphasizing a 
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